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ABSTRACT
The advent of the new constitutional dispensation in 1994 heralded 
signifi cant transformational and governance reform in South Africa. In 
particular the Government White Paper on Local Government of 1998 
formally introduced the concepts of local economic development (LED) 
and of developmental local government into the South African vernacular, 
consistent with the evolving national zeitgeist of the developmental state. 
LED therefore had its genesis in, and was from the start in effect largely 
consigned by statute to the local government sphere – in the South African 
context arguably the governmental sphere least equipped to deal with it. 
From the inception the narrative of LED in South Africa was infl uenced 
less by sound economic prescript than by a complex of ideological and 
welfare considerations.
 It has been observed that typically in practice, “…(l)ocal economic 
development is a highly complex matter, and there is no clear conceptual 
model available that incorporates all of its potentially important dimensions” 
(Smoke 1997). There currently is no evidence of the employment in South 
Africa of systematic methods in the determination of LED goal sets that are 
informed by coherent theories of change and of action.
 The article argues for a fundamental re-conceptualisation and 
demystifi cation of South Africa’s approach to LED based on structured 
integrative engagement within a value chain approach that harnesses 
cooperative effort across jurisdictions and governmental spheres in 
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INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of a preoccupation with LED as a component of South 
Africa’s post-transformation development approach, a plethora of policy papers 
deriving from various government sources attempting to lend impetus to and 
operationalise the as yet amorphous concept of LED has compounded confusion 
and arguably further frustrated the purpose. Though the conceptualisation of 
LED has matured and morphed over time, the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA) in 2009 found that a lack of common understanding of 
the meaning and role of LED and of LED processes constituted a major obstacle 
to effective LED in South Africa. SALGA also found that many LED strategies 
were not grounded in economics and were poorly integrated with other 
programmes. Indeed, the operative conception of LED has focused largely on 
community participation, arguably at the cost of cohesion, internal economic 
consistency and unity of economic developmental purpose. LED initiatives have 
remained largely disjointed and project-based, and have failed to harvest the 
synergies inherent in mutual support and cooperative governance – the latter a 
fundamental tenet of the South African Constitution.
Although it had been debated since before the advent of the new 
constitutional dispensation in South Africa, LED was fi rst formally introduced 
into the South African public governance lexicon and canvassed as a 
developmental tool in 1998 (Republic of South Africa 1998). Yet more than a 
decade later a study of the state of local government in South Africa in 2009 
support of local development that is informed by an internally consistent 
LED model. The concepts and praxis related to LED are complex and 
multidimensional. The article proposes a generic analytical model 
based on a theoretical and conceptual framework which lies on a broad 
cognitive scale of abstraction. The analytical model is thus extrapolated 
from a conceptual and contextual framework forged to understand the 
causal relationships between relevant concepts and processes. The article 
does not pretend to perform an exhaustive evaluation of LED praxis in 
South Africa. Rather, it provides a critical heuristic analysis of selected 
relevant features of the theories of change and of action underpinning 
approaches to LED in South Africa based on the proposed analytical 
model. The article refl ects the fi nding that potentially signifi cant elements 
of South Africa’s theories of change and of action insofar as LED is 
concerned have long remained unsettled.
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found LED had been erratic and that “...(p)lans for local economic development, 
fostering investment, special projects and alignment to national priority 
policies such as detailed in the MTSF (Medium Term Strategic Framework) are 
additional responsibilities that many municipalities are unable to respond to 
effectively…”(SALGA 2009:36). In a separate report specifi cally on the state of 
LED in South Africa SALGA determined in 2010 the following key issues in LED 
praxis in South Africa with specifi c reference to the local government sphere 
(SALGA 2010:11):
 ● A lack of common understanding of the role of LED and LED processes;
 ● An increasing urban-rural divide in LED processes and practices;
 ● The practical spatial constraints of economic planning at a very local level;
 ● A less-than-effective working relationship between provinces, districts and 
local authorities;
 ● A lack of effective LED “networks” in many areas;
 ● The inability of many local authorities to clearly defi ne an LED strategy 
within the broader IDP process; and
 ● A lack of planning resources and capacity.
Anecdotal evidence derived by the authors from extensive interaction in the 
training of offi cials in local authorities charged with LED responsibilities suggests 
that these problems generally still persist, despite the enactment of regulatory 
requirements obliging compliance and a plethora of guidelines. This begs the 
question – why?
In 2010 a National Planning Commission was established in South Africa to 
bring about cohesion and a measure of congruence in national development 
policy and approach. This represented a signifi cant step toward achieving a 
measure of coherence and central direction. In 2011 the Commission diagnosed 
the nine primary challenges still facing the country as follows (National Planning 
Commission 2011):
 ● Too few people work;
 ● The quality of school education for black people is poor;
 ● Infrastructure is poorly located, inadequate and under-maintained;
 ● Spatial divides hobble inclusive development;
 ● The economy is unsustainably resource intensive;
 ● The public health system cannot meet demand or sustain quality;
 ● Public services are uneven and often of poor quality;
 ● Corruption levels are high; and
 ● South Africa remains a divided society.
LED remains explicitly an instrument to address these problems. Nevertheless 
its implementation remains problematic.
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ANALYTICAL MODEL UNDERPINNING THE 
NEXUS BETWEEN THE THEORETICAL PARADIGM 
AND PRAXIS OF LED IN SOUTH AFRICA
A theoretical framework is important to obtain clarity about the relationships 
between elements or issues in a given phenomenon (Ravitch and Riggan 2011). 
After a thorough theoretical exploration a conceptual framework emerges, 
which reveals the scope of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and 
theories that supports and informs the investigation at hand. Such a theoretical 
framework or “idea context” (Miles and Huberman 1994:440), should be based 
on theories that embody the existing corpus of knowledge on the phenomena 
under investigation.
Conceptual frameworks are products of qualitative processes of 
theorisation (Jabareen 2009:49) and can be according to Levering (2002:38) 
regarded as a network of interrelated concepts that, when combined, provide 
a comprehensive understanding and “soft interpretation” of a phenomenon. 
Rather than offering theoretical explanations, conceptual frameworks provide 
understanding, are indeterminist, and do not enable prediction of outcomes 
(Levering 2002:38). Conceptual frameworks are built on ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological assumptions, and each concept within 
a conceptual framework plays an ontological and epistemological role (Guba 
and Lincoln 2005).
In order to facilitate analyses, an analytical model emerges from a conceptual 
and theoretical framework. An analytical model can be constructed by means 
of concept “mapping” (Miles and Huberman 1994:133). Concept mapping can 
take inter alia the form of an abstract framework that maps the relationships 
between concepts, and/or the form of a causal network of variables or 
infl uences (Miles and Huberman 1994:133, 249).
An analytical model should be useful for purposes of scientifi c investigation, 
and is most applicable for variance mapping in studies of complex social 
phenomena. Analytical models generally reveal patterns and causal 
relationships between variances or variables. As such analytical frameworks 
include research instrumentation, possible solution patterns, a model, and a 
method for grouping complex information (Imenda 2014:187). An analytical 
model maps the potential dimensions or vantage points that researchers can 
use in their analyses (Hasna 2007:48). Conceptual and analytical frameworks 
fl ow from the epistemological paradigm a researcher applies when examining a 
given research problem. Such frameworks also establish a structure that guides 
the research.
The authors had to consider higher-level complexities regarding the 
design of both a conceptual and analytical framework as basis for analysing 
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the interrelationship between the theoretical paradigm and praxis of LED in 
South Africa. Tewdwr-Jones (2002) developed an analytical model convenient 
for analysing the LED paradigm and praxis in terms of the three elements 
to inform the planning of deliberate action in the public space. These 
elements are:
 ● The aims to be achieved – these generally are derived from a disaggregation 
and distillation of political manifestos, social mores and other imperatives. 
In developmental contexts in particular the policy space is generally heavily 
goal-laden. The major challenges often encountered in deriving clear 
policy aims are adequacy (does the goal set cover all the issues considered 
important), and internal consistency and coherence as the lack of an explicit 
conceptual model of the intervention frequently constrains the formulation of 
coherent goal sets, in the process compromising from the start the effi ciency 
and effectiveness of policy.
 ● The methods by which aims are to be achieved. Stakeholders’ implicit 
and explicit assumptions on what interventions are envisaged and why 
the problem is expected to respond to such interventions is necessary for 
the planning of coherent deliberate action. Programme theory provides, 
through such tools as causal logic modelling and outcome- and strategic 
mapping, the means of constructing appropriate intervention methodology 
(Chen 2004:248; Chen 2005; Funnell & Rogers 2011). Such approaches 
are also consistent with the value chain-theoretic approach proposed by 
Porter (1985). They provide not only a deliberative means for developing 
LED interventions to activate focused change, but also as noted above a 
convenient model for analysing the LED paradigm and LED praxis in South 
Africa by distinguishing between:
i.  Theory of Change (conceptual theory) refl ecting the change paradigm–
the process by which change is envisaged to come about; and
ii.  Theory of Action (action theory) refl ecting the action paradigm – 
how interventions are to be best constructed to activate the change 
process.
 ● “Social criticism” or how actors and processes should be called to account. 
This encompasses the performance management of interventions and the 
ongoing interrogation of the validity and appropriateness of the theory of 
change itself. Performance management has been defi ned as comprising 
(United States 2016):
i. Planning work and setting expectations;
ii. Continually monitoring performance;
iii. Developing the capacity to perform;
iv. Periodically evaluating performance in a summary fashion; and
v. Rewarding good performance.
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THE EVIDENT METHODOLOGY OF CHANGE
As noted above, it is not the intention of the article to pretend to perform 
an exhaustive evaluation of LED praxis in South Africa, but rather to provide 
a critical heuristic analysis of selected features based on the above generic 
analytical model. In particular it engages with relevant aspects of the theories of 
change and of action underpinning approaches to LED in South Africa.
Development aims to be achieved–a fi rst step toward a 
programme-theoretical approach to development
The environments in which development practitioners operate are typically 
goal-laden, with numerous competing ends deriving from development 
agendas. A number of tools have been suggested to assist in rationalising 
development goal sets. Strategy mapping processes for example explicitly 
interrogate how organisations propose to create value by connecting objectives 
in explicit cause-effect relationships (Kaplan & Norton 2000). These comprise 
value chains (Porter 1985) explicitly linking interventions to one another and 
to strategic goals. As noted above, it is suggested in the analysis that follows 
that potentially signifi cant elements of South Africa’s theories of change and of 
action insofar as LED is concerned have long remained unsettled.
Locating South Africa’s Macro-Development Paradigm 
as a Constituent of the Theory of Change
Faced with the challenges of reconstruction and development following the 
adoption of a new democratic constitutional dispensation after the Convention 
for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), negotiations of 1994, South Africa has 
affi rmed its commitment to development in all spheres of its natural life. This 
imperative to “improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of 
each person” is enjoined in the preamble to the Constitution (Republic of South 
Africa 1994). The broad parameters within which the developmental purpose is 
to be pursued are established in the Bill of Rights comprising Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution. At various junctures since the accession of the African National 
Congress (ANC) to government following the elections of 1994, and spurred by 
the relative success perceived to have been achieved by the model elsewhere, 
the notion of a “developmental state” has surfaced as a vehicle for furthering 
developmental purpose in South Africa. It has been suggested that the notion 
has, in fact, become a unifying project within the governing alliance (Institute 
for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) 2010). It was also explicitly extended to 
the realm of local government in the White Paper on Local Government which 
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appeared in 1998 and which defi ned “developmental local government” as “…
local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the 
community to fi nd sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material 
needs, and improve the quality of their lives…” (Republic of South Africa 1998). 
As will be suggested seriatim, this has set the local government sphere on a 
developmental path that has had implications for the interpretation and praxis 
of LED in South Africa.
There has, however, been signifi cant divergence of views on the construction 
to be placed upon the as yet relatively amorphous notion of the “developmental 
state” that is a recurring theme in the national developmental debate in South 
Africa. This divergence has also refl ected in a degree of confusion of roles and 
responsibilities in promoting LED. To some the imperative of the developmental 
state has come to represent an admission of critical weaknesses in governance 
that has failed to prioritise economic development and to mobilise a broad base 
of resources and support, combined with a preoccupation with industrialisation 
with insuffi cient diversifi cation of the economic base ((The Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) 2005). To others it represents a response to 
the perceived neo-liberal approach epitomised by the so-called Washington 
Consensus, itself a loose compendium of essentially structurally regulatory 
policies that appeared in late 1989 to command some currency for application 
in Latin America at the time (Institute for International Economics 2004 
in Auriacombe & Ackron 2015:78). These policy reforms, comprising the 
“Washington Consensus” and originally rendered as a list of 10 heads of policy, 
generally envisaged a more facilitative and less prescriptive and interventionist 
stance on the part of government and included such provisions for example as 
(Institute for International Economics 2004 in Auriacombe & Ackron 2015:78):
 ● “Redirecting (public) expenditure from politically sensitive areas 
(that)… receive more resources than their economic return can justify…
toward neglected fi elds with high economic returns and the potential to 
improve income distribution, such as primary health and education, and 
infrastructure”;
 ● “(Unifi ed) exchange rate(s)…at a level suffi ciently competitive to induce a 
rapid growth in non-traditional exports”;
 ● “Barriers impeding the entry of foreign [direct investment] should be 
abolished…”;
 ● “Privatization of state-owned enterprises”; and
 ● A legal system providing “…secure property rights without excessive costs 
and (making) these available to the informal sector”.
The pursuit of enhanced economic competitiveness formed an important 
centrepiece of the approach, to be enabled mainly through human resources 
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development (education and training) and infrastructure investment. 
Contemporary World Bank policies also shied away from “selective 
interventions” on the part of the state, proposing such neutral facilitative 
interventions as infrastructure development and the development of a skilled 
and healthy workforce through education and training together with essentially 
institutional interventions to ensure contract enforcement and the protection of 
property rights, effective regulation, private capital formation and the expansion 
of fi nancial markets (World Bank 2005).
But if the compendium of policies initially advanced by Williamson as the 
“Washington Consensus” was loose, the body of response characterising the 
notion of the so-called “developmental state” initially coined by Chalmers 
Johnson arguably appears in important respects even less coherent. Johnson 
initially envisaged the developmental state as characterised essentially by 
(Johnson 1999:38–39):
 ● “…a small, inexpensive but elite state bureaucracy staffed by the best 
managerial talent available in the system…”;
 ● “…a political system in which the bureaucracy is given suffi cient scope to 
take initiative and operate effi ciently…; and
 ● “…a perfection of market-conforming methods of state intervention in the 
economy”.
This appears to be a far cry indeed from the current expanding governmental 
monolith erected in South Africa to serve a developmental purpose under the 
mantle of a “developmental state”.
Where Johnson (1999) had conceived the developmental state as 
characterised by focused state intervention to achieve economic development 
as its primary goal through mobilisation of resources within an explicitly 
capitalist paradigm, others sought for example to broaden its focus into such 
areas as equitable development, sustainable development, and democratic 
development not necessarily as means to an economic end, but as ends in 
themselves (Stiglitz 2004; Leftwich 1995). Whereas some would go so far 
even as to equate the essential developmental state with direct intervention 
in business decision-making, state ownership of the means of production or 
command of the economic high ground, others would suggest a more nuanced, 
interventionist role limited essentially to selected direct interventions in both 
macro- and micro-economic planning (Marwala 2009). The establishment of a 
National Planning Commission in May 2010, to develop a long-term vision and 
strategic plan for South Africa and to rally the nation around a common set of 
objectives and priorities to drive development over the longer term, is consistent 
with the notion of a stronger, more structured and central role for government 
at least at the helm of state planning and the determination of the way forward 
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for the country. Yet others would posit the developmental state as somewhere 
in the middle between the far left and the far right and characterised in essence 
by the ability of the state to “drive development by guiding capital toward new 
activities while maintaining broad-based support, including the support of 
workers” ((The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 2005).
That the notion of the developmental state provides a home to so many 
diverse interpretations arguably erodes its value as a determinant of coherent 
deliberate action toward the achievement of development aims in accordance 
with the requirements of programme theory. Indeed, the modalities of its 
interpretation and implementation are crucial to the defi nition of coherent and 
internally consistent approaches for example to LED and other developmental 
imperatives that fl ow from it. South Africa’s National Development Plan makes 
reference in its executive summary to the priority of “…building a capable and 
developmental state…” (National Planning Commission 2012a:16) and to a “…
developmental state [that] builds the capabilities of people to improve their own 
lives, while intervening to correct historical inequalities. Neither government 
nor the market can develop the necessary capabilities on their own…” (National 
Planning Commission 2012a:17). However, it does so without defi ning the term 
other than to observe that “…(a) developmental state tackles the root causes of 
poverty and inequality. A South African developmental state will intervene to 
support and guide development so that benefi ts accrue across society (especially 
to the poor), and build consensus so that long-term national interest trumps 
short-term, sectional concerns” (National Planning Commission 2012a:44). The 
reader is left substantially at large to infer a construction of the core notion of 
the “developmental state” in the South African context. The preoccupation of 
South Africa’s Public Service Commission with the Far Eastern experience in 
which “developmental states”, characterised by “ideological capacity (with)…
political leaders that are driven by a developmentalist nationalist ideology” 
(Public Service Commission 2014), has been perceived to have contributed 
to rapid economic development, provides a further small dimension to the 
(evolving) construction of the as yet largely amorphous notion in the South 
African context.
South Africa’s National Development Plan refl ects the need to build a 
capable and professional developmental state (National Planning Commission 
2012b:407 et seq). The Public Service Commission also opines:
“…A key feature of a developmental state is strong institutions, especially 
an effi cient and effective bureaucracy. Its institutions (organisational structures 
and rules) enable a developmental state to act authoritatively and in a binding 
fashion to achieve its goals and objectives. One of the main institutional 
attributes of a developmental state is its ‘autonomy’. Indicators of autonomy 
include meritocratic recruitment, career paths for public servants, insulation 
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of bureaucratic elites from direct political pressure (which also speaks to the 
administrative political interface), and the existence of a ‘super-ministry/
coordinating ministry’ managed by professional and competent public servants. 
A professional, prestige-laden and competent public service is one of the 
main determinants of the capacity of a developmental state, and it is its key 
driver of success. These institutional characteristics underline the technical and 
organisational capacities of developmental states, such as those in Asia and they 
account for their superior development performance that has been celebrated 
across the globe. That East Asian Developmental States, including Japan, 
South Korea and Singapore, have become developed economies is largely due 
to the quality of these states’ institutions in general and their Public Services 
in particular. Similarly, that Brazil, China and Malaysia are among the fastest 
developing economies and have removed millions of people from poverty 
within a generation is primarily due to their capable public services. The fact 
that China is the factory of the world and will soon become its largest economy 
is primarily because of the quality of the Chinese Public Service” (Public Service 
Commission 2014).
But, apart from some measure of congruence around the need for sound 
and capable institutions of public governance in keeping with a more direct 
interventionist role on the part of the state, a unifi ed and more comprehensive 
defi nitive notion of the “developmental state” for South Africa as yet remains 
largely elusive. The need for improved effi ciency and capacity where a more 
direct interventionist role is envisaged for the state would, however, seem 
self-evident. But at a deeper level the suitability in the South African context 
of constructions of the notion of the developmental state that have been 
concluded in different contexts elsewhere in the world to have provided 
successful development paradigms has been challenged. It has been suggested 
that whereas South Africa at present in key respects constitutes a transfer 
welfare state, neither the East-African, the present transfer of welfare, nor the 
liberal state paradigms can sustainably address South Africa’s challenges of 
unemployment, inequality and poverty going forward. A social investment state, 
founded on human resource investment and increased absorption in skilled 
and more lucrative employment, and predicated upon improved effi ciency 
and performance of the public sector is indicated (Burger 2014). In addressing 
particularly the replicability of the conditions precedent for a successful 
developmental state modelled after the style of those of East Asia in particular 
it has been observed that “…(w)hile some aspects of this model (for instance, 
greater political insulation of economic policy makers) could reasonably 
be achieved in African countries, the extensive co-ordinated economic 
interventions of the East Asian states are well beyond the administrative faculties 
of most African governments” (Mkandawire 1996).
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Notably, the basic macro-paradigm for South Africa thus remains as yet in 
key respects undefi ned and unsettled. This has potential implications for the 
LED mandate and the achievement of a structured integrative approach to local 
economic development that harnesses all available synergies. That an element 
of central direction is required seems clear. It is the nature and measure of that 
direction, and the capacity of the state to undertake a role in it, that remains 
at issue. The appointment in May 2010 of the National Planning Commission 
heralded a signifi cant and concerted attempt to achieve coherence in 
development policy and approach and, provided that a structured integrative 
approach is followed, provides potentially decisive leverage for revitalising and 
refocusing fl agging and as yet relatively unrequited LED effort.
South Africa’s local economic development paradigm has evolved through 
a number of iterations over the years. Where initially, though avowedly 
“economic”, it was characterised by a strong, explicitly pro-poor social welfare 
bias, and located as a community development function essentially within 
the welfare sector, it has now evolved to a more comprehensive economic 
approach, albeit arguably one still narrowly focused on communities as closed 
entities substantially in isolation rather than on communities within their more 
comprehensive open economic context. The initial LED Guidelines issued by 
government in 2000 (Republic of South Africa 2000a) refl ected a rejection of 
earlier market- and primarily industrial investment-driven development policy 
based on subsidisation. In de-emphasising the market the approach had, 
however, arguably removed itself substantially from the “economic” milieu. 
The early guidelines identifi ed a number of imperatives as pillars of the new 
“LED” approach namely: community development, the development of human 
capital, improved provision of municipal services, the reduction of “leakages” 
from local economies and the retention (and, where necessary, protection) 
of local economic activities (Bond 2002). LED was promoted essentially 
as a “bottom up” approach which tended further to suggest “new local 
economics” and to miss the essential fact that often solutions to community 
developmental challenges are not to be found in those communities but require 
integrated solutions and engagement across many jurisdictions outside of those 
communities. The “bottom-up” approach therefore may be argued to have 
had the effect of fragmenting the LED initiative that should in fact have been 
integrated from the start. It also tended to suggest a role for municipalities in 
parochial economic development for which they were inadequately capacitated 
and for which in fact they were not constitutionally mandated. The year 2000 
also saw the enactment of legislation enshrining in statute the policy principles 
refl ected in the earlier White Paper on Local Government and enjoining 
municipalities to engage in integrated development planning and to produce 
Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) (Republic of South Africa 2000b:36–46) 
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regulated to contain an explicit LED component. A problem was, however, 
that these provisions appeared in local government legislation, fortifying the 
notion in the bureaucratic mind that LED was a local government matter and 
arguably further alienating it from the larger economic fabric and cementing 
it as a largely parochial community activity. An IDP is in fact defi ned in the 
relevant statute as “…a single, inclusive and strategic plan for the development 
of the municipality…” (Republic of South Africa 2000b:36). However, the 
nuance of interpretation of the term “municipality” whether as an “entity” 
(the municipality) or as a “geographic area” (the municipal area) as defi ned 
in Chapter I of the Act is most often missed. IDPs and their associated LED 
strategies are narrowly viewed to be proprietary plans for and by the local 
government, frequently not recognising or engaging with activities of other 
agencies, or external infl uences, affecting the municipal area and its residents, 
or indeed the local economy. Likewise, departments and other agencies in the 
national sphere in particular, but also in the provincial sphere, do not participate 
suffi ciently actively in integrated development planning activities. The results 
frequently are “integrated” development plans that are anything but “integrated”.
Further LED guidelines appeared in 2001 (Republic of South Africa 2001) 
and a draft LED policy appeared in 2002 (Republic of South Africa 2002). 
In 2003 Meyer-Stamer (2003a:5) observed that “…in South Africa, LED is 
a mandatory task of local government. However, there is no clear concept 
and no consistent pattern of implementation…”. Similar fi ndings on the state 
of confusion prevailing in the interpretation of an LED paradigm were also 
expressed by others at this time. A study led by Rhodes University found in 
2005 that “…(t)here is a need to ...arrive at an acceptable series of defi nitions 
of just what is meant by key terms such as: LED, pro-poor LED, pro-growth LED 
and pro-poor growth /inclusive LED. Given the lack of consensus about these 
terms nationally and internationally, consensus is clearly needed…” (Rhodes 
University 2005:87). Further LED guidelines appeared in 2005 (Republic of 
South Africa 2005) and 2006 (Republic of South Africa 2006a).
But a shift in emphasis was indeed taking place away from the earlier narrow 
communo-centric, pro-poor view toward a more comprehensive and inclusive 
developmental approach that embraced local “community” economies as 
elements or building blocks of an integrated economic developmental ecology. 
Economic growth and poverty eradication were key preoccupations of the 2005 
guidelines (Republic of South Africa 2005) while by 2006 the emphasis had 
shifted explicitly to “stimulating and developing sustainable local economies” 
(Republic of South Africa 2006a). More nuanced perspectives such as those 
of Meyer-Stamer (2003b) regarding more effective LED in South Africa, and 
as summarised as follows by Meyer (2014:5), were increasingly evident in the 
evolving avowed LED intent, if not in its execution:
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“…the creation of a clear distinction between LED and community 
development initiatives, refrain to solve problems by throwing money to the 
problem, ongoing analysis of local economic sectors and address market 
failures, stimulate entrepreneurship and business development, maximize 
existing local resources such as fi nance, natural resources, and human skills 
by the utilisation of mentors, identify and implement “quick wins” projects and 
creation of a strong partnership between public and private sectors…”.
Indeed, the approach to LED has fi nally evolved to a point where it “…
is concerned with creating robust and inclusive local economies that exploit 
local opportunities, address local needs and contribute to natural development 
objectives such as economic growth and poverty eradication…” (Meyer 
2014:5). The nuance shift appears, however, not to have been effectively 
communicated to all practitioners in the LED value chain, many of whom are 
insuffi ciently capacitated for such a process. Blair and Carroll (2009:250), in 
supporting a nuanced approach as between “welfare” and “economics” in 
community development, observe: “…Communities that tilt too far in favour of 
programs that assist the poor at the expense of wealthier population cohorts face 
the destabilising prospect of attracting more poor and discouraging wealthier 
residents…. (On the other hand) state and local governments may seek to 
attract businesses and wealthy residents at the expense of low income groups. 
A race to the bottom can develop in which benefi ts to low-income groups are 
reduced to make the area more attractive for more affl uent groups…”. Blakely 
and Leigh (2010:329–356) draw a signifi cant distinction between “community 
development” and “community economic development”, the latter itself an 
element of a more comprehensive notion of “local economic development”. 
Where community development traditionally focuses on a broad range of 
development issues, “…community economic development focuses on the 
neighbourhood scale of socioeconomic transformation in a distressed locality. 
Community economic development seeks to improve conditions within a 
geographic area that is populated by the disadvantaged and unable to control 
its socioeconomic direction or resources… Development efforts…within the 
neighbourhood may very well need to focus on strengthening linkages external 
to the neighbourhood. Strengthening those linkages often entails the economic 
side of community development…” (Blakely & Leigh 2010:329). By this 
measure it seems that what in the South African development paradigm had 
for over a decade passed for “local economic development” was in fact the 
more limited notion of “community development” or “community economic 
development”, with a relatively unstructured approach to, and de-emphasis 
of, the building and strengthening of economic linkages. This approach 
manifested in an emphasis on “popular participation” and the designation 
in the main of Community Development Offi cers (so-called CDOs), with a 
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welfare rather than an economic background, to perform the LED role in the 
local government sphere.
South Africa’s National Spatial Development Perspective that appeared 
in 2006 further informed the apparent catharsis in thinking regarding the 
LED paradigm in South Africa (Republic of South Africa 2006b:70–90). This 
national policy perspective on spatial development explicitly recognised that a 
disjuncture existed between the needs of communities on the one hand and the 
potential of those communities to address and sustainably satisfy those needs in 
situ on the other, and provided a more explicitly regional rationale for economic 
development with which the prevailing “LED” approach had to come to terms. 
The national perspective had been preceded by a pioneering initiative in similar 
vein in the Western Cape to perform a matrix mapping of the growth potential 
of towns in the province and their developmental needs that also suggested a 
more spatially nuanced and widely strategic approach to LED (Western Cape 
2004). It was increasingly evident that LED involved a great deal more than the 
comparatively banal parochial conception of “…local government committed to 
working with citizens and groups within the community to fi nd sustainable ways 
to meet their social, economic and material needs, and improve the quality 
of their lives…” as envisaged in the 1998 White Paper and still a stubbornly 
pervasive theme in conventional LED thinking. In reality, as suggested by Blair 
and Carroll (2009:89–130), LED is a proposition within the wider context of 
regional development and needs to be informed by that body of knowledge. 
Local economies are largely open systems, interacting dynamically with the 
wider regional contexts in which they are located. A parochial view of LED 
frustrates such perspectives. National legislation providing for example for the 
establishment of industrial development zones (IDZs) in South Africa (Republic 
of South Africa 1993) and special economic zones (SEZs) (Republic of South 
Africa 2014) have direct LED implications for communities and are thus, in an 
informed and comprehensive LED paradigm, integral elements of nuanced LED 
strategy and practice that admits all available means to optimise interventions 
in support of development in local communities, irrespective of whether or 
not they fall within local government mandates or indeed originate within 
local communities.
Locating South Africa’s Theory of Action 
in Local Economic Development
That local government has a role in LED is generally not in doubt. However, what 
seems to be a problem is the assignment of roles in LED and the commensurate 
capacitation of government in accordance with those roles. Blair and Carroll 
(2009:249) observe:
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“The role of government in economic development goes beyond subsidies 
and tax abatements that directly affect business decisions. An equal or more 
important role is performing a number of traditional tasks well, creating the 
overall atmosphere that encourages economic development. Accordingly local 
economic development (LED) offi cials are involved in a wide variety of local 
governance issues…”.
Indeed, the potential impact of local government actions on the local 
economy generally goes far beyond the direct effect of its comparatively limited 
explicitly “economic” functions. From its inception LED in South Africa was 
synonymous with local government. Yet the Constitution (Republic of South 
Africa 1994) in Section 156 assigns only a relatively limited number of explicitly 
“economic” functions to the local government sphere. A common problem is 
encountered with the uncritical and insuffi ciently nuanced interpretation of 
the local government mandate and particularly of the provisions of Section 
152 of the Constitution dealing with the objects of local government. These 
“objects” are often erroneously interpreted as “functions”, fortifying the 
impression that local government is comprehensively responsible for the 
promotion of economic development, a role for which it is insuffi ciently 
capacitated. The National Planning Commission in regard to the interpretation 
of local government mandates also had cause to observe (National Planning 
Commission 2011:24): “…A lack of clarity about the powers and functions of 
local government exacerbates the fi nancial problems faced by municipalities 
and is a critical factor impeding progress in service provision. This has led to 
municipalities being saddled with a burden of “unfunded mandates” in areas 
such as housing, libraries, roads, water treatment and other infrastructure…”.
The White Paper of 1998 in Section B explicitly addresses as follows the 
nuanced role of local government in LED (Republic of South Africa 1998):
“…Through its traditional responsibilities (service delivery and regulation), local 
government exerts a great infl uence over the social and economic well-being of 
local communities. Each year municipalities collect a large sum in rates, user 
charges and fees. They employ thousands of people throughout the country. In 
many cases they are responsible for the price and quality of water, electricity and 
roads, and they control the use and development of land. In parts of the country 
they own substantial amounts of land. They purchase goods and services and pay 
salaries, and therefore contribute to the fl ow of money in the local economy. They 
set the agenda for local politics, and the way they operate gives strong signals to 
their own residents and to prospective migrants or investors. These functions give 
local government a great infl uence over local economies. Municipalities therefore 
need to have a clear vision for the local economy, and work in partnership with 
local business to maximise job creation and investment. Local government is not 
directly responsible for creating jobs. Rather, it is responsible for taking active 
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steps to ensure that the overall economic and social conditions of the locality 
are conducive to the creation of employment opportunities. Provision of basic 
household infrastructure is the central contribution made by local government to 
social and economic development…”.
In 2005 it had been opined that, “…The recognition of LED as a function has 
mostly come from IDPs, not from a formal allocation of functions and indeed 
this is not recognised in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution which defi ne the 
functions of provincial and local government…” (Rhodes University 2005:87). 
A similar theme is developed in paragraphs 28–30 of the LED guidelines of 
2005 (Republic of South Africa 2005):
“Whilst the Constitution (1996) places a great responsibility upon municipalities 
to facilitate LED, the schedule in the Constitution that lists the functions of 
municipalities does not include LED…it is envisaged that municipalities play a 
connector role in respect of LED whereby they draw on resources locked in a 
range of different government support instruments into their localities…The idea is 
not for municipalities to run programmes themselves but to focus on establishing 
forums to build partnerships and to network with a range of stakeholders…Finally 
LED should not be viewed only as a programme but everything that a municipality 
does impacts on the local economy…For example, procurement policies can be 
structured to address the use of local labour, and all infrastructure development 
should refl ect positively on the development of the local economy, whatever its 
purpose…”(Republic of South Africa 2005).
In short, the powers and functions of local government assigned in Section 
156 of the Constitution should be exercised in a way calculated to have the 
maximum impact on the social development of communities, addressing the 
needs of the poor, and the growth of the local economy. LED as such is not a 
function of local government, nor does it imply the assumption of additional 
functions by local government. Rather, it requires a more economically informed 
and nuanced approach to the exercise of the functions explicitly assigned to 
local government in terms of the Constitution in such a way as optimally to 
support the development of robust local economies as a sustainable basis for 
improved community prosperity.
These nuances of interpretation of the role of local government in LED 
appear largely to have been missed. Indeed the authors’ experience has 
been that few offi cials in the local sphere charged with LED have engaged 
at all critically with the relevant source documentation or the operative LED 
paradigms and approaches to LED as refl ected in the various guidelines. 
Instead, LED strategies and interventions in the local sphere remain signifi cantly 
detached and disjointed, determined by whim, fi at or expediency rather than 
by coherent economic rationale, and with a prevailing parochial ad hoc project 
bias. Whereas municipalities are required in terms of the White Paper on Local 
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Government of 1998 to play a “connector” role in LED, with the exception 
possibly of the larger metropolitan local authorities currently comprising nine 
out of a total of 267 local authorities in South Africa few local authorities as 
yet can muster the necessary insight and capacity adequately to interpret and 
perform that role. In 2005 the question had already been asked in relation to 
the LED responsibilities placed upon municipalities “…whether many local 
governments are actually in a position to assume such responsibility given the 
nature of the applied constraints which they face?” (Rhodes University 2005:81). 
This key fatal defi ciency arguably has had, and continues to have, signifi cant 
implications for the effi cacy of LED as an instrument for development in South 
Africa. Statutorily, in terms of Section 27 of the Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000), district municipalities are enjoined to inform 
the approach to integrated development planning of Category B municipalities 
comprising their districts (Republic of South Africa 2000b:39), but this most 
frequently is not comprehensive and district municipalities themselves are 
capacity constrained. The National Planning Commission had cause in 2011 to 
observe that “…(o)utside the metros, the two-tier structure of local government 
is not working as effi ciently as the policy makers had intended. This is primarily 
because the districts have inadequate fi nancial, human and physical resources 
to play their intended planning and coordination roles” (National Planning 
Commission 2011:24).
In response to the perceived incapacity of local authorities to engage 
optimally in LED a tool was developed in 2009 to assess the LED “maturity” 
of local authorities against fi xed criteria (SALGA 2013). This tool was intended 
to be implemented in both the local and provincial spheres in order to attempt 
to identify and target specifi c LED implementation capacity defi ciencies. After 
initially being rolled out in Gauteng, it was employed in Mpumalanga and 
parts of the Eastern Cape. In 2012 the Western Cape Department of Economic 
Development and Tourism (DEDAT) began using the tool to inform their support 
of LED (SALGA 2013). The value of the tool will, however, ultimately depend on 
the employment of a suitably contextualised and appropriately nuanced South 
African LED paradigm to inform the maturity metric.
The roles of the various public sector agencies in LED in South Africa have 
been summarised as follows (SA LED Network 2016):
 ● National government: Coordination of public policies and investment 
programmes. A National LED forum exists for the purpose.
 ● Provincial Government:
i.  Coordination–Provincial LED forums should be established to mirror the 
national forum in the provinces;
ii.  Resource allocation in accordance with the requirements of municipal 
IDPs; and
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iii. LED capacity building and LED support to municipalities.
 ● Local Government: Creation of a favourable environment for LED through a 
partnership between business, community interests and municipal government.
 ● Government Agencies: The Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) 
and the Sector Education and Training Agencies (SETAs) responsible for 
capacity building are specifi cally identifi ed as potential role players in LED.
 ● Foreign Donor Agencies: Foreign funding is regarded as particularly 
signifi cant in LED interventions.
 ● Local Economic development Agencies (LEDAs): Such agencies take various 
forms and are established in the local government LED space for specifi c 
LED purposes.
While the organisational links of the LED value chain are thus present, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the institutional linkages across jurisdictions by way 
of strategic mapping and systematic structured engagement along LED value 
chains connecting these links are as yet largely absent. Problems of integration 
are compounded by defi ciencies in integrated development planning processes 
in the municipal sphere that retain a largely parochial focus and still produce 
municipal IDPs that are not “integrated”.
In diagnosing the root of the problem frustrating the performance of the public 
sector in the wake of transformation, inevitably also refl ected in part in South 
Africa’s legacy of performance against the LED imperative, the National Planning 
Commission has observed that “…policies designed to improve the representivity 
of the public service work best when accompanied by effective management, 
training and recruitment processes. Where management structures do not operate 
effectively, the need to focus on improving staff skills through mentoring and 
training is neglected…At the local government level, past practices of engaging 
professional institutes in the training, selection and development of senior managers 
have diminished, while bodies like the Institute of Municipal Finance Offi cers and 
Municipal Engineers have little infl uence over appointments to critical positions. 
The result has been a reduction in the number of professionals available to the state, 
and a looming crisis in the generational reproduction of professional expertise as 
the ageing cohorts continue to leave the system. This skills defi cit has an adverse 
impact not only on frontline service delivery…but also on the ability of government 
to engage in long-term planning (and)… coordination across institutions…” 
(National Planning Commission 2011:23). To the extent that effective LED requires 
value chain linkages across many jurisdictions and governmental spheres, the 
cumulative effect of inadequate performance at multiple points along the LED value 
chain on LED outcomes stands to be signifi cant.
Correcting these problems presents a particular challenge. Andrews, Pritchett 
and Woolcock (2012) have warned against the dangers of “isomorphic mimicry” 
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in the form of cosmetic interventions to achieve sustained improvement in 
public performance resulting in a fl ow of development resources and legitimacy 
without demonstrated improvement in performance, thereby undermining the 
impetus for effective action to build state capacity. A consequence of such false 
initiatives is what they term “…capability traps in which state capability stagnates, 
or even deteriorates, over long periods of time even though governments remain 
engaged in developmental rhetoric” (Andrews et al. 2012:1) They propose a 
process of Problem-driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) involving:
 ● Finding local solutions to locally-nominated and defi ned performance 
challenges as opposed to transplanting preconceived and packaged “best 
practice” solutions;
 ● Creating an authorising environment for decision-making that encourages 
positive deviance and experimentation as opposed to compliance;
 ● Establishment of tight feedback loops to facilitate rapid experiential learning 
rather than reliance on formal ex-post evaluations; and
 ● Broad engagement to test viability, legitimacy and relevance of innovation 
rather than sole reliance on “top-down” innovation by external experts.
It appears that South Africa’s LED initiative may well be caught up in just such a 
“capability trap” requiring decisive multi-dimensional intervention at a number 
of points and levels in the value chain.
“SOCIAL CRITICISM”–TOWARDS 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT OF LED
Rabie and Cloete (2013) have remarked on the emergence of evidence-based 
decision-making as the prevailing international paradigm for policy analysis and 
-management. However, the amorphous nature of many, if not most, formal LED 
programmes and interventions render the analysis of performance, if not the 
achievement of performance itself, problematic. Indeed, it has been observed that 
“…LED is often conducted in a pragmatic and ad-hoc way that makes monitoring 
and evaluation diffi cult…” (GTZ & Mesopartner 2008). In the absence of value-
chain analysis and a strategically mapped approach ex ante to LED intervention, 
ex post “outcome mining” generally is resorted to as a reference basis in evaluating 
LED performance. Rabie and Cloete (2013) have suggested such a scheme of 
generic outcome indicators for measuring LED results.
In 2005 it had been observed of LED in South Africa that, “…Monitoring 
and evaluation (was) weakly developed and often not applied, poverty targets 
are not always in place and many municipalities are not able to fully ascertain 
the impact of their actions...” (Rhodes University 2005:81). Anecdotal evidence 
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suggests that after the passage of a further decade performance management of 
LED in South Africa still remains problematic. In general inter alia the following 
defi ciencies still present on a case-by-case basis in the municipal sphere:
 ● Inadequate identifi cation of outcomes to be achieved;
 ● Lack of a logical progression of cause and effect through intermediate stages 
of intervention toward desired outcomes i.e. lack of a clear theory of change;
 ● Inadequate indicator development corresponding to outcomes and 
intermediate outputs and objectives;
 ● Inadequate process planning rendering the defi nition of appropriate indicators 
of process effi ciency problematic i.e. lack of a clear theory of action;
 ● Inexplicit role defi nition and assignment of responsibilities along value chains and 
across governmental and other spheres and jurisdictions towards LED outcomes;
 ● Inadequate resource planning rendering the determination of resourcing 
effi ciencies problematic; and
 ● Economic naïveté and insuffi cient economic insight constraining capacity to 
generate appropriate LED intervention strategies and to construct coherent 
value chains for their implementation.
CONCLUSION
With the pronouncements in the White Paper on Local Government of 1998 
South Africa embarked on an ambitious journey in LED. But the achievement of 
its objects have arguably been frustrated by unsettled and parochial paradigms, 
the lack of a structured integrative approach to LED that recognises its dividends 
as the shared outcome of a complex of deliberate, mutually supportive actions 
across governmental spheres and jurisdictions, and by ancillary problems 
such as defi ciencies in integrated development planning processes and lack of 
capacity of key role players at multiple points in the LED process. To the extent 
that a fl ow of development resources and legitimacy into the LED approach in 
South Africa over two decades, despite continual evaluation and diagnosis, as 
yet has not delivered the level of cohesion and focus in performance across 
jurisdictions necessary for its realisation, it appears that South Africa may well 
be caught in a capability trap from which only deliberate and concerted action 
on a number of fronts will release it.
NOTE
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